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Labor and the Supreme Court:
Review of the 1996-1997 Term
Keith N. Hylton*
I. Introduction
The U.S. Supreme Court's 1996-1997 Term will surely not be remembered among lawyers for its decisions in the employment area. Most of
these decisions involved narrow questions of statutory interpretation,
and for the most part the Court has handed down opinions consistent
with existing case law. There was not one National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA)' decision this Term and the two employment discrimination
cases involved fairly technical issues of statutory interpretation. The
feeling of a quiet year is put across by simply reading the statutes at
issue other than Title VII: 2 the Federal Employers' Liability Act
(FELA)3 (one case), the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act (LHWCA)4 (two cases), the Jones Act 5 (one case), the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) (four cases, three involving preemption), and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)7 (one case).
A relatively quiet year such as this presents a challenge for anyone
asked to review the new decisions. The stuff that makes labor law interesting, the conflicts between employer property rights and statutory
interests observed in many NLRA and Title VII cases, cannot be found
in the cases of this Term. In a more exciting or more dramatic year
there would be one or more cases that would suggest a framework from
which all of the other employment decisions of the Term could be viewed.
There are no such cases this Term, so I am forced to provide my own
framework.
Since I am an economist, I have approached these cases from an
economic perspective. In some cases, particularly the public sector employment decisions of this Term, I have taken a contract-centered approach, which is to ask whether and how the employment agreement
*Keith N. Hylton is a professor of law at Boston University. In 1996-97, he served
as Secretary of the ABA Section of Labor and Employment Law. He thanks his research
assistant, Deborah Loesel, for help with this article.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1994).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
3. 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. (1994).
4. 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1994).
5. 46 App. U.S.C. § 688 (1994).
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-209 (1994).
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itself could solve the problem brought before the Court and whether
the Court's decision is consistent with that solution. In other cases,
particularly those interpreting Title VII and other statutes, I have focused on the incentive effects of the Court's decision.
The statutory interpretation cases are generally defensible in their
implications for incentives. This suggests to me that the Court, in spite
of all of the words written about the plain language of the statutes, is
really quite concerned with the incentives created by its rulings. Justice
Breyer's opinions openly reveal this concern over incentives.
Where the Court seems to get it wrong, from my reading of this
Term's decisions, is in the set of cases in which it is important to have
some sense of what the likely employment contract would provide. For
example, in Richardson v. McKnight,' a case dealing with the qualified
immunity of private prison guards, the Court relies heavily on an analysis of incentives to justify its decision when I think a different conclusion
would have been reached by an approach that looks at the parties'
expectations in the employment agreement. There is, of course, a more
general argument lurking underneath: I think courts should start by
asking what the employment contract would most likely provide and
if that yields no clear answer, examine the incentive effects. In this
Term's decisions, the Court in my view has tended to focus almost exclusively on incentive effects.
II. Trends in the Supreme Court's Labor and
Employment Decisions
When I pulled together all of the decisions from this Term, I was
struck by the fact that I had not one NLRA decision in the sample.9 I
had not expected many, given the decline over the past several years
in the Court's overall docket. I had also begun this project with the
belief that the Court's share of NLRA decisions had been declining over
time, though I had no hard evidence to prove it.
The hard evidence is assembled in Figures 1 through 5. Figure 1 (see
next page) shows that the Court's caseload, after hitting a high ofroughly
150 cases in the early 1980s has declined steadily to 74 this Term. 10 The
decline appears to be particularly steep after 1985, with the Court deciding roughly 6 fewer cases every year between 1985 and 1995.11
8. 117 S. Ct. 2100 (1997).
9. One NLRA case, Allentown Mack Sales and Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 117 S. Ct. 1105
(1997), was granted certiorari on March 3, 1997, but oral argument was not heard this
Term. California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A.,
Inc., 117 S. Ct. 832 (1997) was initially filed on the grounds of both the NLRA and ERISA
preemption, but the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court decided it on ERISA grounds.
10. The numbers for each year are provided in the Appendix. The total excludes
per curiam decisions.
11. On the Court's declining caseload, see The Fading Court,THE EcoNOMIsT, May
1, 1993, at 30.
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Figure 1
Supreme Court Cases, 1967-1996
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Figure 2 (see below) shows NLRA cases as a percentage of the Court's
total caseload. My initial belief is confirmed by the data. Although the
numbers jump around a bit, one can discern a negative trend running
from roughly four percent of the Court's total caseload to less than two
percent. Over the past thirty years, there have been only two Terms
in which there were no NLRA decisions, 1987-88 and this Term.
Why the NLRA percentage has been declining is not entirely clear
to me. Michael Gottesman, in his review of the Court's decisions last
year," suggested that labor cases have declined largely because the

Figure 2
NLRA Cases as a Percentage of Total Cases, 1967-1996
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12. Michael H. Gottesman, Labor,Employment andBeneft Decisions ofthe Supreme
Court's 1995-96 Term, 12 LABOR LAW. 325 (1997).
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NLRA is now a relatively old statute, and old statutes raise fewer new
problems for litigants.1 3 However, the decline in the NLRA percentage
seems to become steeper after 1985, i.e., after the sharp downward turn
in the Court's overall caseload. Although one can generate several
hypotheses (e.g., the Court, being more conservative, agrees with the
decisions of lower courts, which have also become more conservative
over the years; or lower courts, foreseeing the Court's shift, hand down
decisions that would be acceptable to the Court), precisely why the Court
would hear relatively fewer NLRA cases after 1985 remains to be
explained. If the decline in the NLRA percentage after 1985 is attributable to reactions-by litigants and by lower court judges-to the Court's
more conservative stance, 4 then the age of the NLRA may not be the
most important factor behind the decline in its share of the Supreme
Court's caseload. And perhaps a change in the composition of the Court,
particularly one which makes it appear more liberal, might lead to
an upsurge in NLRA-related certiorari petitions and in NLRA cases
accepted for review. 5
Figure 3 (see below) shows Title VII cases as a percentage of the
total over the past thirty years. Here again we see evidence of a steep
decline, though this one seems to have started in 1981. That the evidence

Figure 3
Title VII Cases as a Percentage of Total Cases, 1967-1996
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13. See id. at 327.
14. I should define what I mean by "conservative." I mean that if the Court hears
a dispute involving a conflict between statutory interests and employer property rights,
the Court is likely to decide in favor of employer property rights.
15. Figure A-2 in the Appendix shows that the number of certiorari denials, where
the NLRB is a party, has been declining over the period 1967-1996. Thus, the drop in
the percentage of NLRA cases is clearly due in large part to a decline in the number of
certiorari petitions.

Labor and the Supreme Court: Review of the 1996-1997 Term

267

Figure 4
ERISA Cases as a Percentage of Total Cases, 1974-1996
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of decline appears here even though Title VII is part of a much younger
statute than the NLRA lends support to the view that a statute's age
may not be the most important factor explaining the decline of certain
statutes in the Supreme Court's caseload.
Figure 4 (see above) shows ERISA cases as a percentage of the
Court's caseload. The statute was enacted in 1974, so the time line
begins at that point. While NLRA and Title VII cases have been declining since 1985 as a percentage of the Supreme Court's caseload, ERISA
cases have been increasing.
This is a troubling trend for people who were attracted to labor law
by the issues in NLRA or in Title VII litigation: cases dealing in a
straightforward way with basic questions of fairness and reciprocity in
the employment relationship. ERISA cases have the same issues deep
down but the statute is technical, and calls for the skills one would
bring to the teaching or practice of tax law. Barring a dramatic change
in the Supreme Court's conservative-liberal balance, the day may soon
come in which ERISA cases make up by far the largest share of the
Court's labor and employment decisions. Traditional labor and employment law teachers will not, for the most part, be attracted to the prospect
of reviewing these decisions.
I have included the last figure-Figure 5 (see page 268)-to show
that not all statutes can be characterized as increasing or decreasing
as a percentage of the Supreme Court's caseload. Figure 5 shows FLSA
decisions, which have been relatively few and stable as a share of the
Court's docket. The age of the FLSA seems not to have influenced its
share in the Court's caseload. What is probably more important is that
the statute raises relatively few controversial issues. The NLRA and
Title VII are different and special in this respect, because they tend

268
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Figure 5
FLSA Cases as a Percentage of Total Cases, 1967-1996
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to generate conflicts between employer property rights and interests
protected by the statute. No doubt it would be better if these conflicts
could be avoided in the first place. But without them, much of labor
and employment law would involve narrow, technical, and somewhat
dull exercises in statutory interpretation.
The trends in Supreme Court employment decisions examined in
this section suggest no clear answer to the question why NLRA and
Title VII cases apparently have declined in recent years as a percentage
of the Supreme Court's caseload. One hypothesis is that these declines
have occurred because the NLRA and Title VII are relatively old statutes. However, this is inconsistent with other observations; for example,
that the declines are most noticeable in the 1980s, and that FLSA, also
a relatively old statute, has had a very stable though small share of
the Supreme Court's caseload. An answer to this puzzle would require
a separate study, but for now I will offer the hypothesis that the predictions of litigantsrather the statute'sage play the biggest role in influencing a statute's share of the Supreme Court's caseload. Over the 1980s,
the Court became more conservative. As a result, litigants formed
sharper predictions of the Court's decisions in controversial employment cases, particularly those involving conflicts between employer
property rights and statutory interests. Since litigants and lower courts
had developed a better sense of the Court's likely decision, litigants
had less incentive to appeal decisions and lower courts were more likely
to issue a decision the Court would affirm. I think this hypothesis provides a better explanation of the recent decline in NLRA and Title VII
decisions in the Court's caseload. It also suggests that these downward
trends may reverse in the future.
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III. Preliminary Remarks on the Economics of the
Employment Relationship
Since economics will play a substantial role in this review of the
Court's decisions, I should set out some of my general views on the economics of the employment relationship. There are several arguments
for doing this. First, already briefed with my general views on employment law, the reader will, I hope, find it easier to understand some of the
conclusions I reach on individual cases. Second, I think it is possible when
viewed from an economic perspective to see that certain labor laws that
seem to serve quite different purposes actually have a great deal in common. Third, I think it is important to clear the air on the question of what
economics has to say about the employment relationship. Lawyers and
law students have been exposed to economic analysis of law largely from
the "Chicago School" perspective, which overemphasizes the degree to
which markets work flawlessly in allocating resources.
Needless to say, markets do not work flawlessly in allocating resources, and it would be equally wrong to say that they do not work at
all, or that government regulation can always improve upon the market.
Let me take this moment to lay out an alternative to the Chicago perspective.
A. Types of Labor and Employment Regulation
In my view, almost all of the laws regulating the employment relationship-the laws which are the subjects of the decisions reviewed below-can be grouped into one of three categories. One group consists of
"minimum term" laws: laws which attempt to force employers to meet
some external (as opposed to contractual) standard on wages, hours, or
other conditions of employment. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),
directly regulating pay and hours, is the core example of this sort of
law. I would also put the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA),16
FELA, ERISA, and LWHCA in this category. FELA imposes liability
for negligence, but I refer to it as a minimum term statute because it
imposed liability standards that differed from the common law, which
supplied the background rules for the employment relationship, when
it was enacted.
A second group of laws falls neatly into the category of "employment
discrimination," and these, of course, are laws that attempt to prevent
employers from treating one group of employees worse than another
group. The examples are Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 17 and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA).' 8
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq. (1994).
17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (1994).
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (1994).
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The third group consists of "collective bargaining" laws-that attempt to promote unionization and bargaining, such as the NLRA and
the Railway Labor Act (RLA)."9
These categories are to some extent arbitrary, since one could argue
that employment discrimination laws actually belong in the minimum
terms category. But this is true of any attempt to put laws in various
categories. I will add a fourth category to capture one subset of the
decisions reviewed below: public sector labor regulation. There are versions of laws from the previous three categories that apply to public
sector employees. However, public sector employees also have their own
special statutes and since the 1970s have also been aided by decisions
which extend protection of the U.S. Constitution to the property interests these employees have in their jobs. I wish to consider separately
these special rules governing the employment relationship in the public
sector.
B. Economics and Employment Regulation
Does economic analysis suggest that all of these laws are unnecessary intrusions by the government into the employment relationship?
No. There are essentially two considerations that go into assessing the
desirability of employment regulations: information and competition.
Chicago-school skepticism toward the desirability of government intervention in the labor market can be justified when workers are well
informed about the conditions of work and markets are competitive.
To see what I mean, consider an example. Suppose typists in a certain worksite, say a university, are likely to suffer repetitive stress
injuries, and these injuries will reduce their productivity so that each
typist will lose $5,000 in future income as a result of stress injuries at
their current employment. An employee who planned to work for five
years as a university typist, aware of the cost of injury, would demand
an additional $1,000 per year above the minimum he would otherwise
accept.
If these numbers were clear to all of the parties, there would be
little need for government regulation or for liability rules to reduce the
incidence of repetitive stress injury. The employer, faced with demands
for additional compensation, could decide whether to vary the typist's
work assignments to reduce the likelihood of injury. If it were cheaper
to alter assignments than pay $1,000 more in compensation, then the
employer's incentive would be to alter work assignments.
The point of this example is to show that under certain conditions,
some relevant aspects of the employment relationship are simply part
of the employment contract. There may be certain types of risk that
society is unwilling to let individuals accept in employment, but that
19. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1994).
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is a different issue. If there are risks that society is willing to allow
employees to accept, then if employees are fully informed as to these
risks, the employment contract will be structured in a way that minimizes the total costs imposed by these risks and compensates employees
for the risks accepted as part of employment. This is an implication
of a more general statement known among economists as the "Coase
theorem. '2' The point was also made earlier and very clearly, in the
employment context, in the famous Farwell opinion of Justice Shaw in
1842,21 which argued that employees should not be able to collect damages for certain risks that are presumably taken into account in the
employment contract.
The difficulty in transferring this hypothetical to real world settings
is that the assumptions I have made may not be satisfied; employees
are not always informed about risks they will face on the job. Many
employment risks are learned only through experience on the job, and
by then it is usually too late for the employee to either alter the relationship or demand compensation for the risk.
However, even if we accept the position that employees will be unaware of certain employment risks, there is still a chance that labor
contracts will be designed to minimize the costs of employment risks
and to compensate employees for special risks they accept. Competition
will sometimes lead employers to provide the information that employees need to assess job risks. For example, suppose applicants for typing
jobs at universities think that the cost of repetitive stress injury will
be $5,000 at every university, but that there are some sites where the
cost is actually lower (because they have modified job assignments).
Then those employers who have reduced the expected stress injury cost
have an incentive to provide information
in order to gain a competitive
22
advantage in the labor market.
I do not want to be understood as overselling the wonders of the
market. I began this discussion with the claim that I would stake out
an alternative to the Chicago school view of regulation. To a large extent, the alternative is implicit in what I have said so far. The conditions
under which employment contracts will be designed to minimize costs
associated with employment risks and to fully compensate employees
for those risks-"full information" and "competition"-are by no means
guaranteed. Indeed, the central feature of one large area of employment
20. The argument is put forth in R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
EcoN. 1 (1960).

21. Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842).
22. Suppose employees are unaware of $5,000 loss from repetitive stress injury. If
the employer can eliminate the risk at a cost of $200, then those employers who have
already eliminated the risk have an incentive to inform employees in order to gain a
competitive advantage. And it follows from this that even employers who have not eliminated the risk of injury could gain a competitive advantage by spending $250 to do so
and informing prospective employees.
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law cases-public sector employment law-is the absence of competitive
pressure.
Since employees are not fully informed and since not all markets
are competitive, there is surely some scope for employment laws to lead
to improvements in the welfare of employees. In reviewing the cases
below, I take that as the background economic principle rather than
the skeptical view of the Chicago school.
More important, I will review the cases largely from a contractcentered perspective, i.e., one that asks whether there are reasons to
believe that the employment contract alone is not capable of solving
the problems before the parties. My harshest criticisms of the Court's
reasoning will appear in those cases where I think the decision, or the
relevant case law, cannot be justified from a contract-centered perspective. The public sector decisions of this Term are particularly easy to
criticize from this perspective.
Of course, a contract-centered perspective cannot be applied to all
of the decisions, particularly those where a statute clearly requires
something foreign to the parties' contract. This is true of most of the
discrimination and minimum terms cases reviewed below. In these
cases, I will tend to focus on the incentives created by the Court's decision and by the relevant case law. In general, I find most of the Court's
decisions in these cases easy to defend from an economic perspective,
suggesting the Court is quite aware of the incentive effects of its decisions on statutory interpretation.
IV. The Cases
A. Public Sector Employees
The largest and most interesting set of employment-related cases
this Term involved public sector employees. Coming to these decisions
from an economic perspective, I find most of them confusing and difficult
to justify.
In my view, the important cases in this area are Gilbert v. Homar,23
Board of County Commissionersof Bryan County v. Brown,24 and Richardson v. McKnight.2" I will also briefly discuss McMillian v. Monroe
County, Alabama26 and Clinton v. Jones,27 though both have little relevance to day-to-day public sector labor issues. Gilbert v. Homar deals
with the special procedural protection against summary termination
enjoyed by public sector employees. The other cases all deal with some
aspect of tort immunity in public sector employment.

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

117
117
117
117
117

S.
S.
S.
S.
S.

Ct.
Ct.
Ct.
Ct.
Ct.

1807
1382
2100
1734
1636

(1997).
(1997).
(1997).
(1997).
(1997).
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I will start with Gilbertv. Homarbecause within the set of the public
sector decisions this Term it is the only one that is clearly centered on
an employment law issue.
1. New Property Law: Gilbert v. Homar
Richard Homar was employed as a police officer at East Stroudsburg
University (ESU) when he was arrested and charged with a drug felony
on August 26, 1992. ESU immediately suspended him without pay, but
Homar did not find out about the suspension until the next day. On
September 18, 1992, Homar was allowed to explain his actions to ESU
officials. The ESU officials told Homar that they had received serious
information about him from the Pennsylvania state police, but he was
not told the exact source. Homar received a letter on September 23,
1992 that informed him of his demotion to groundskeeper, and that the
police had shared details with ESU of his confession regarding social
affiliations with marijuana dealers and a purchase of a small quantity
of the drug. Homar filed a § 198328 claim charging a due process violation
because he did not receive notice or a hearing before his suspension.
The district court granted summary judgment for ESU and the Third
Circuit reversed.29
The issue before the Court was whether a tenured public employee
arrested and charged with a felony is entitled, under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to a hearing before being suspended without pay. The Court held that due process does not require
a pre-suspension hearing for an employee suspended without pay on
the basis of felony charges, but that such an employee is entitled to a
prompt post-suspension hearing.3 °
The Court's justification consisted largely of distinguishing this case
from Cleveland Board ofEducation v. Loudermill,1 which held that an
employee dismissible only for cause should receive a hearing before
termination where the written and oral evidence for the reasons should
be presented, the employer's evidence should be explained, and the
employee should have a chance to argue his or her case. The Court
noted that this rule does not apply across the board. 3 If the situation
requires quick action by the state, especially if there is a strong state
interest, and the deprivation is made on warranted grounds, then a
post-deprivation hearing meets the requirements of due process.
This was such a case in the Court's view. To determine the process
that was required, the Court applied the balancing test of Matthews v.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
29. See 89 F.3d 1009 (3d. Cir. 1996).
30. See Gilbert, 117 S. Ct. at 1812-14.
31. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
32. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545-46.
33. See Gilbert, 117 S. Ct. at 1812.
34. See id.
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Eldridge,35-weighing the private interest of the employee, the risk of
an erroneous deprivation, and the government's interest-and held that
a presuspension hearing was not required. 6 Homar's private interest
in uninterrupted receipt of a paycheck was less important than that of
the employee in Loudermill, who was terminated. The state's interest
was substantial, given that it had (in Homar) an employee occupying
a position "of great public trust and high public visibility ' 37 who had
been charged with a felony. The Court saw no reason to require the
state to continue paying Homar during his suspension because "[i]f his
services to the government are no longer useful once the felony charge
has been filed, the Constitution does not require the government to bear
the added expense of hiring a replacement while still paying him." 3 The
risk of an erroneous deprivation was small in this case because the
felony charges were preceded by an investigation by the Pennsylvania
State Police.
I find it easy to accept the Court's cost-benefit analysis in this case,
and yet all that the argument shows is that the case for a presuspension
hearing in Gilbertis not as strong as in Loudermill.That does not prove
that a presuspension hearing is unreasonable or not consistent with
previous due process decisions. Moreover, the Court's conclusion that
due process does not require the state to continue paying a public employee who has been suspended because of a felony charge seems to
have been pulled out of thin air. The source of this conclusion surely
was not Loudermill, for that decision includes the dictum that "in those
situations where the employer perceives a significant hazard in keeping
the employee on the job, it can avoid the [due process] problem by suspending with pay." 39 The Third Circuit, after reading this dictum, came
to the not unreasonable conclusion that prior case law required either
a presuspension hearing or suspension with pay.
There is, in addition, a very sensible, intuitive argument for the
Third Circuit's view of the case, which suggests that the doctrine of
Loudermill really does require suspension with pay. In the absence
of the requirement to pay Homar, ESU would have little incentive to
schedule a prompt post-suspension hearing. On the other hand, forced
to continue paying Homar, the university would have had a very strong
financial incentive to schedule a prompt post-suspension hearing. Thus,
the payment requirement suggested in Loudermill has the advantage
of providing a built-in policing mechanism, doing away with the need
for satellite litigation over whether the state had provided a sufficiently
prompt post-suspension hearing.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

424 U.S. 319 (1976).
See Gilbert, 117 S. Ct. at 1812.
Id. at 1813.
Id.
470 U.S. at 544-45.
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At bottom, the questions raised by the reasoning of Gilbert are traceable to such decisions as Loudermill, Board of Regents ofState Colleges
v. Roth,4" and Perry v. Sinderman,4" in which the Court has held that
public employees who can be fired only for cause have a constitutionally
protected property interest in their tenure and cannot be fired without
due process. To be sure, the Court did say clearly in Gilbert that it was
not deciding whether the "protections of the Due Process Clause extend
to discipline of tenured public employees short of termination,"42 and
perhaps if faced with this question directly the Court would not extend
due process protection. But, in the meantime, we are stuck with the
implication of Loudermill that due process safeguards do extend to the
disciplining of employees, and the earlier holdings regarding termination.
The Court's "new property" cases, finding constitutionally protected property interests in government jobs, are quite hard to defend
on economic grounds. These cases do not involve property interests in
the traditional sense; they deal with employment contracts between a
state and an individual. The property interests created by these contracts are no different from the property interests created by an employment contract in the private sector. If a private employer promises to
fire an employee only for cause, that promise surely does not contain
a promise of a presuspension hearing, or any particular procedural safeguard, unless the agreement says so explicitly or there is an industry
custom that should be read into the contract in the absence of language
to the contrary. In other words, the employee's property interest or
"entitlement" is defined entirely by the terms of the contract.
Why the public sector should play by different rules is not clear to
me. The employee property rights created by an employment contract
signed with the government should be no different from those created
by the same contract signed with a private firm. I have seen no reason
to believe that the employee will interpret a contract differently when
the employer is in the public rather than private sector; so in terms of
expectations, which property rights are designed to protect, there is no
difference in these settings. Yet the case law reads property in its most
expansive sense in the public sector, while letting private employers
continue to narrow, as they see fit, the entitlements traded to employees.
This is rather perverse when one thinks of the key differences between the private and public sectors. Public sector employers generally
do not have competitors. In addition, voters do not to pay close attention
to, say, the salaries of police officers in deciding whether to vote for a
certain mayor (who will negotiate with the police officers union). Be40. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
41. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
42. 117 S. Ct. at 1811.
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cause of the lack of pressure to reduce costs in order to fend off rivals
and the absence of owners who demand cost reductions, public sector
employers tend to have higher costs and to be less efficient than private
sector employers. The Roth and Loudermill line of cases make this relative inefficiency worse.
2. Immunity Cases
The remaining public sector employment cases deal with various
questions of immunity from liability. Again, these cases are not primarily employment law cases, but they deal with such important employment-related issues that I consider them worthy of coverage. In examining these cases I will continue to apply the contract-centered perspective
developed so far.
A. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY: RICHARDSON V. McKMGHT"

The efficiency of public sector employers relative to private sector
employers, an issue never addressed but at the bottom of Gilbert,came
to the surface immediately in Richardson. Unfortunately, the Court
again reached a conclusion that is hard to accept when one focuses on
the likely employment contract.
McKnight was serving a prison sentence at a privately-run Tennessee state prison. He filed a § 1983 suit against Richardson and Walker,
both prison guards, after they injured him by applying certain physical
restraints too tightly. The district court did not grant the guards' motion
to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity, arguing that a private
corporation, rather than the state, employed the guards."' The Sixth
Circuit, while noting that private defendants sometimes receive the
same immunity as public employees, held that public policy reasons
precluded extending immunity to prison guards.45
The issue in Richardson was whether guards employed by a privately-run prison are entitled to a qualified immunity defense to a
§ 1983 lawsuit. The Court held that they could not assert the qualified
immunity defense available to public sector guards.46
Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, relied on two arguments. First,
an examination of history revealed no strong support for providing immunity to private prison guards.47 Second, the immunity doctrine's purposes did not, in Breyer's view, warrant immunity for private prison
guards.48 It is the second argument which is the most interesting and
43. 117 S. Ct. 2100 (1997).
44. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2102.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 2103.
47. See id at 2104-05. The common law has allowed remedies in inmate suits against
private jailers. The Court did not find any cases supporting immunity for intentional
conduct or for private persons operating for profit.
48. See id at 2105-08.
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probably the strongest. The first argument, based on history, was thoroughly torn apart in a dissent by Justice Scalia.
So what is the argument based on purpose? The purpose of immunity, Breyer noted, is set out in earlier cases "as protecting 'government's ability to perform its traditional functions,' " ensuring that
" 'talented candidates were not deterred by the threat of damages suits
from entering public service,' " contributing to " 'principled and fearless decision-making,' " and other similar verbal formulae. 49 Breyer
focused on the "unwarranted timidity" concern and noted that this
is not such a big problem when firms operate in the private sector.5 °
The reason is that competitive pressures will restrain a private prison
operator. If its guards are too aggressive, the damages incurred through
liability will raise the firm's costs, which in turn will raise the likelihood
the firm will be ousted by a rival when its contract comes up for competitive bidding. Similarly, if the guards are too timid the firm will face
the risk of replacement when a rival comes along who is capable of
doing a better job at the same or at a lower cost.
Since market pressures offset the incentive toward timidity created
by tort liability (or a no immunity rule) Breyer could see no reason to
grant immunity to private sector prison guards.
When I read this case the first time, my intuition led to the opposite
conclusion. Since competitive pressures constrained private operators
from becoming too timid or too aggressive, it seemed to me that there
was even less of a need in the private-management arena to make
guards liable for injuries caused to prisoners while carrying out their
duties in good faith. Let us suppose that private guards do enjoy qualified immunity. Then if they are too aggressive they will still cause the
state's costs to rise, through the cost of treating injured prisoners, or
the cost of quelling prison riots provoked by maltreatment, or the costs
of dealing with prisoner complaints within administrative processes.
A firm that could reduce those costs would have a good shot at taking
over the contract from the overly aggressive incumbent. While immunity would prevent tort suits from fully internalizing the costs suffered
by prisoners at the hands of overly aggressive guards, it would not
remove all cost-based pressure to restrain overly aggressive conduct in
a competitive prison-management system.
It seems to me that liability is somewhat more useful in the publicly
managed system. There we may have a timidity problem when guards
consider the risk of private damage suits. But we can equally well have
a problem with over-aggressiveness under the immunity rule, since the
guards are neither subject to damages, when acting in good faith, nor
subject to pressures from competition.
49. Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2105 (citations omitted).
50. See id at 2106-07.
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Where does this leave us? I think it shows that the timidity factor
may be insufficient as a basis for this decision. One could make a persuasive argument-I think as persuasive as Breyer's-that there is no need
to deny private jailers a qualified immunity defense, because the market
already pressures them from becoming too timid or too aggressive, unlike what we observe in the publicly managed regime. In the end, we
have an argument for privatization and not much more.
How should this problem be answered? I think one has to approach
the "purpose" question from a different angle than that chosen by
Breyer. Let us start with the easiest cases for immunity: judges and
legislators, who enjoy absolute immunity rather than the qualified immunity at issue in Richardson. Why is it sensible that judges have
absolute immunity? Several reasons come to mind. First, even the most
perfect judge in the universe will always be required to make a decision
that harms someone, that is the nature of the job. The losing party will
in many cases have an incentive to challenge the judge's motivation.5 '
In order to minimize the tendency toward timidity created by the threat
of litigation, it makes sense to grant immunity from suit to judges. A
second factor is involved: judges do not make decisions in a vacuum,
so that a badly reasoned decision, so badly reasoned that it suggests
bad faith on the part of the judge, is likely to be reviewed by other
judges and come to the attention of the public. Thus, the likelihood of
ajudge using the cover of immunity to decide disputes in favor of friends
and against enemies is diminished, to some extent, by the prospect of
review and the self-inflicted reputational harm that would result. These
arguments apply with only slight modifications to the legislator.
Now let us consider the police officer, who unlike the judge or legislator enjoys only qualified immunity, which means that the police officer
may be held liable if he acts in bad faith. Why not grant absolute immunity to the police officer? Like the judge, he must in the course of his
work take actions that adversely affect some individuals, and many of
them will have an incentive to bring a claim against the officer. But
there are important differences between the judge and police officer
even though both have considerable room to exercise discretion. First,
judges often make decisions that pit one economic interest group against
another, for example, landlords versus tenants; while police officers do
not. Thus, the incentive to litigate will be somewhat less in the case
of the police officer, and the typical claim easier to resolve on the basis
of law. Second, the police officer's actions are more likely to lead to
irreversible harm, with little chance for public review and correction.
It makes sense in this setting that we would provide potential victims
the opportunity to bring a claim against an officer who acts in bad faith.
51. For an analysis of immunity along this line, see Ronald A. Cass, Damage Suits
Against Public Officers, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1110 (1981).
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Such a claim would operate as a deterrent at precisely the point at
which it is needed.
Prison guards in publicly-managed prisons enjoy qualified immunity, like police officers. Since they are carrying out at least some of
the functions of police officers, operating on essentially the same group
of lawbreakers, this is what one would expect-provided that one accepts
society's determination to grant qualified immunity to police officers.
Should prison guards in privately-run prisons enjoy the same qualified immunity available to guards in publicly-run prisons? Why there
should be a difference I cannot see. The economic or incentive-based
argument for providing qualified immunity to police officers and to
prison guards in publicly-managed prisons has nothing to do with the
public-private status of the employer. The argument for providing qualified immunity is based entirely on the functions performed by these
actors. Their work, carried out with reasonable care and in good faith,
is highly desirable from a social standpoint. Yet, because it involves
harming others at times, it is very likely to lead to frequent damage
claims asserted against them. We provide qualified immunity to prison
guards (in public prisons) not simply to minimize the problem of timidity, but because harming others is part of the job.
This is a good point to return to the contract-centered perspective
introduced in earlier in this paper. The Court's decision in Richardson
never confronts a central issue that I think one is forced to consider
when trying to determine the nature of the employment relationship
in this setting. Whether a prison is run by a private firm or public
employees, it surely cannot come as a surprise to prospective prison
guards that they will sometimes be called upon to use violence against
prisoners. Indeed, the threat of using violence is always at work, for
how else can they be sure that the prisoners will stay put. Some degree
of immunity from prisoner injuries is implicit in this employment
agreement, just as one would expect some degree of immunity from
injury claims is implicit in the agreement to accept a position as a
professional football player. Again, all of this has nothing to do with
the public-private status of the employer. This is largely a matter of
understanding the employment contract.
B. VIcARIous EMPLOYER LIABILITY: BOARD OF CouNTY CoMMIssIoNERS OF
BRYAN COUNTY, OK v. BROWN

52

While driving from Texas to their home in Oklahoma, the Browns
came upon a police checkpoint. They decided to avoid it by returning
to Texas. The police chased them at high speeds, stopped the car, and
ordered them out. When Jill Brown (the wife) refused, Reserve Deputy
Stacy Burns used a maneuver (called an "arm bar") to remove her
52. 117 S. Ct. 1382 (1997).
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from the car. Brown sustained injury to both of her knees. She later
underwent corrective surgery, but may ultimately need knee replacements.
Brown sued Burns, Bryan County, and the Bryan County Sheriff
B.J. Moore under § 1983, alleging the use of excessive force, and municipal liability stemming from the Bryan County sheriff's failure to adequately investigate Burns' criminal background. The county moved for
judgment as a matter of law, arguing that one single hiring decision
did not make them liable under Section 1983. The district court denied
the motion and Brown won the jury trial.53 The Fifth Circuit affirmed.54
The issue before the Court was whether Sheriff Moore's single hiring
decision gave rise to municipal liability under § 1983. The Court held
that a municipality is not subject to § 1983 liability in the absence of
a willful action that is the cause of a deprivation of rights.55
The Court based its holding on Monell v. New York City Department
ofSocial Services,56 which held that municipalities are "persons" under
Section 1983 and therefore are not liable on the sole basis of respondeat
superior." The plaintiffs must show evidence, the Court said, of a municipal policy or custom that brought about the injury.5" The plaintiff must
also show a level of culpability by the government body, and a link
between the action and the deprivation of rights.59 These standards are
applied strictly in a case where the plaintiff claims an employee of
the state caused the rights deprivation,60 since the courts wish to avoid
imposing respondeat superior liability.
With this high standard set out, it was not difficult for the Court
to find the sheriffs hiring decision insufficient as a basis for Section
1983 liability. The Court said that since it was not "plainly obvious"'"
that hiring Burns would cause the deprivation of rights in this case,
the sheriff was not "deliberately indifferent"62 to the plaintiffs rights,
and thus could not be shown to have the required level of culpability.
I find the dissents filed by Souter and Breyer more persuasive than
the majority opinion. Souter argues that the facts of this case do show
the level of culpability required for municipal liability under § 1983.3
Burns is the great-nephew of Sheriff Moore. In the same year that Burns
was hired by Moore, he pled guilty to nine moving violations, charges
53. See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1386.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 1388.

56. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See Monell, 436 U.S. at 689.
See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1388.
See id.
See id. at 1389.
Id. at 1393.
Id. at 1392.
See Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1394.
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of assault and battery, resisting arrest, public drunkenness, and a
charge of driving with a suspended license. The jury-as would be true
of just about anyone reading this case-found it hard to believe Sheriff
Moore would have hired anyone outside of his family with a background
similar to Burns's. And if hiring a person like Burns is not exhibiting
"deliberate indifference" to the rights of his potential victims, then I
do not know what to call it.
Breyer's dissent questions the whole basis of Monell. Breyer notes
that the law in this area, as the majority opinion reveals, has become
so complicated that it hardly serves to provide guidance to municipal
policy makers and employees.'
I would take the argument a bit further. Monell should be overturned because it doesn't make sense. To see why this is so, let us
consider the reasons for vicarious employer liability in the private sector. One persuasive incentive-based argument for respondeat superior
liability is that employees will often be judgment-proof with respect to
the damages that certain businesses, such as railroads, will generate.
Making the employer strictly liable corrects the incentives owners and
managers would otherwise have to ignore losses suffered by tort victims
with whom they have no contractual relationship.
Why should municipalities play by different rules? An attempt to
answer this question returns us to the issues at the heart of our previous
case, Richardson.Public sector employers, recall, are generally not subject to competition. Thus, competitive pressures that would ordinarily
push a private sector firm to restrain the conduct of its employees in
order to avoid harming third parties-the pressures identified by Breyer
in Richardson-arenot working to the same degree in the public sector.
It seems, then, that the argument for vicarious employer liability is
stronger in the public sector than in the private sector.
The contract and incentive-based arguments come together to suggest that vicarious employer liability should be the general rule in the
public sector, as it is in the private sector. The contract-based argument
for employer vicarious liability is that the employee acts as the agent
of the employer, and therefore both are responsible for the harms caused
by the negligence of an employee acting within the scope of the employment contract. The incentive-based argument begins from the viewpoint
that public sector enterprises consist of collections of rational, selfinterested individuals who are no less in need of being constrained by
the threat of liability as are their counterparts in the private sector.
The argument for liability is, if anything, stronger with respect to public
sector enterprises because they do not face the pressures of competition.
One could argue that it is useless to shift injury costs into the public
sector because they will simply be passed on to the taxpayer. However,
64. See id. at 1401.
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I see the question as between placing some degree of constraint through
the threat of liability on the public sector, or no constraints. I think
some degree of constraint is the preferable position.
c. TWO RELATED IMMUNITY CASES
The immunity cases discussed up to this point have involved public
sector employees who enjoy qualified immunity, such as prison guards
and police officers, and for this reason have some relevance to routine
public sector labor issues. The Court also decided two cases this Term
dealing with public sector officials who enjoy the rare privilege of absolute immunity: McMillian v. Monroe County, Alabama 5 and Clinton
66
v. Jones.
In McMillian, the Court held that because of Alabama constitutional
provisions regarding sheriffs and the interpretation given them by the
Alabama Supreme Court, Alabama sheriffs, when executing their law
enforcement duties, represent the state instead of the counties in which
they are located."7 From this holding and the Alabama Constitution's
sovereign immunity provision, it follows that an Alabama sheriff is
absolutely immune from all suits for damages based on his official acts.
Clintonv. Jones dealt with the unofficial acts of the current occupant
of the White House when he was governor of Arkansas. Put broadly, the
Court held that although the president ofthe United States is entitled to
absolute immunity from damages based on his official acts, he enjoys
no immunity for unofficial acts.6"
In light of the framework developed earlier in this section, the case
for providing absolute immunity to the president of the United States
is straightforward. The president will necessarily make decisions in
the course of carrying out his official duties that anger many people,
and many of them will have an incentive to sue him. Indeed, one could
say that making decisions that lead to a transfer of wealth from some
individuals to others is such a central part of the president's job that
it could not be carried out without a blanket of absolute immunity.
Further, the president's actions are taken largely in the public's view,
and are often challenged and reviewed by members of Congress and by
federal judges.
What about the Alabama sheriff? The case for absolute immunity
is not nearly as strong here. Sure, the sheriff will anger many people
in the course of doing his job. But making decisions that lead to a transfer
of wealth between different interest groups is not a central part of the
sheriff's job. In theory, the sheriff is executing laws that should benefit
everyone, and his discretionary decisions are limited to emphasizing
65.
66.
67.
68.

117
117
See
See

S. Ct. 1734 (1997).
S. Ct. 1636 (1997).
McMillian, 117 S. Ct. at 1735.
Clinton, 117 S. Ct. at 1643-45.
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certain laws over others. Further, the sheriff does not operate under
the same degree of public review as do judges and legislators. In sum,
most of the common sense arguments for absolute immunity do not
point very strongly in the direction of providing it to county sheriffs.
Functionally, they seem to be closer to the ordinary policeman than to
the legislator or judge.
B. Employment Discrimination
My criticisms of the public sector cases of the previous section centered on how difficult the decisions were to justify in terms of the expectations of the parties. Expectations are not so important in the discrimination cases of this Term, or of any Term for that matter. One
fundamental aspect of employment discrimination litigation is the
charge that the employer, because of discrimination, acted in a manner
inconsistent with the explicit and implicit terms of the employment
agreement. Speaking broadly, the goal of employment discrimination
litigation is to make employers comply with their agreements by not
using race or sex to deny qualified employees positions they would ordinarily step into under the terms of the agreement. For this reason it
seems more appropriate, to me, to examine the incentives created by
the law in this area rather than the expectations of the parties.
The two Title VII cases decided this Term are surprisingly similar.
Both involve technical statutory interpretation questions that have surprisingly big implications for the scope of Title VII. The Court decided
against the employer in both cases.
89
1. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.

Shell fired Robinson in 1991. After that, Robinson filed a race discrimination claim with the EEOC. Robinson applied for a job at another
company, and Shell gave his prospective employer a poor reference,
allegedly in retaliation for filing the EEOC claim. The district court
dismissed Robinson's claim on the ground that Section 704(a) of Title
VII (anti-retaliation clause) does not apply to former employees."v The
Fourth Circuit reversed, but an en banc hearing resulted in an affirmation of the district court.7'
The issue in Robinson was whether Title VII's anti-retaliation provision applies to former employees. The Court held that Title VII's ban
on retaliatory actions by employers applies to actions taken against
former as well as current employees.7 2
I will not trouble the reader with a restatement of the Court's reasoning, which for the most part involved parsing the language of the stat69. 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997).
70. See Robinson, 117 S. Ct. at 845.

71. See id.
72. See id at 849.
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ute. The interesting part of the opinion discusses the perverse incentives
that would be generated by siding with the employer. There the Court
defends its interpretation on the ground that
to hold otherwise would effectively vitiate much of the protection afforded by Section 704(a). According to EEOC, exclusion of former employees from the protection of Section 704(a) would undermine the
effectiveness of Title VII by allowing the threat of post-employment
retaliation to deter victims of discrimination from complaining to
EEOC, and would provide a perverse incentive for employers to fire
employees
73 who might bring Title VII claims. (internal citations
omitted)
Of course, there is an argument for the employer. Making the employer liable under Title VII to former employees makes it difficult for
the employer to provide honest evaluations of former employees to other
employers. In addition, an employee who wants to shield himself from
a negative evaluation may be advised, as a result of this decision, to
file a discrimination claim with the EEOC.
These arguments really concern questions of proof rather than the
scope of the statute itself. The employee will have an incentive to file
an EEOC claim in order to shield himself from a negative evaluation
only if there is a reasonably high probability that an employee who has
performed poorly can convince the court that his negative evaluation
was the result of discrimination rather than an honest assessment of
his work. Courts have generally dealt with this problem, which is common in labor and employment litigation, by putting a high burden of
proof on the plaintiff. As long as this is possible-as it surely must be
given the discretion of judges-there is no need for the Court to arbitrarily cut down the scope of the statute.
2. Walters v. Metropolitan EducationalEnterprises,Inc.74
In Walters, the Court was concerned with measuring the number
of days an employer must have fifteen or more employees in order to
be subject to Title VII. The employer, Metropolitan, argued that an
employer does not "have" an employee on a working day if the employee
receives no compensation. The employee and the EEOC argued that
an employer has an employee if he or she appears on the payroll, regardless of whether the employee receives compensation for that working
day. The Court sided with the EEOC.75
As in Robinson, the Court made an effort to show that its position
was the most sensible reading of the statute. The Court also noted that
Metropolitan's proposed method of determining whether an employer
has an employee would be administratively burdensome, since it would
73. Id. at 848.
74. 117 S. Ct. 660 (1997).
75. See Walters, 117 S. Ct. at 666.
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require someone to pore over company records to determine whether
each employee whose name appears on the payroll actually received
compensation for each working day counted.76
The most persuasive argument for the Court's conclusion focused,
as in Robinson, on the incentives created by the employer's preferred
interpretation of the statute. The Court pointed out that under Metropolitan's approach
[a] company that has 15 employees working for it on each day of a
5-day workweek is covered, but if it decides to add Saturday to its
workweek with only one less than its full complement of employees,
it will become exempt from coverage.77
Indeed, what about the case of a firm with one hundred employees that
adds Saturday to the workweek, putting in a crew of fourteen on that
day? Is it too fanciful to believe that a large employer, already running
its plant on Saturdays, might reduce the Saturday complement to fourteen in order to evade the statute?
C. Summing Up the Title VII Decisions
There are those who think the Court has become so conservative
that it will side with the employer in just about any discrimination
case. This seemed a rather popular view after the 1988-89 Term, in
which the Court decided Wards Cove PackingCo. v. Atonio,7 s after which
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 79 The Title VII cases of
this Term provide a clear disproof of the claim that the Court is unreceptive to Title VII claimants. Both Robinson and Walters were unanimous decisions, with the two most conservative members of the Court,
Scalia and Thomas, writing the opinions.
Reading these cases against the Court's 1988-1989 Term, it seems to
me that the Court has no interest in weakening the scope of or reducing
compliance with Title VII, as one might expect of a court that is hostile
to the statute. The better view is that the Court, out of concern for
protecting the employer's common law rights, is inclined to require
plaintiffs to meet a high standard of proof in discrimination cases. This
view is consistent with the results of this Term and the 1988-1989 Term.
D. Minimum Term Statutes
I have labeled the third major category of cases decided this Term
t"minimum term statutes." The cases all deal with statutes which insert
minimum terms into the employment agreement, and by this I mean
76. See id. at 665.
77. Id.

78. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994). For a discussion of Wards Cove and the reaction of
Congress, see Ronald D. Rotunda, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Brief Introductory
Analysis of the CongressionalResponse to JudicialInterpretation,68 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
923 (1993).
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terms that are not explicitly part of the contract or that differ from
relevant common law. As in the previous section, I will focus on the
incentives created by the Court's decisions.
1. Employer Liability Statutes
There were three employer liability cases this Term, one involving
the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), and two involving the
Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act (LHWCA). For the
most part, one sees the Court struggling to find an appropriate fit between the standards defined by the statute and the standards of the
common law of torts. The Court seems to treat tort law as providing a
set of background or default rules which should be adopted, in the face
of uncertainty, unless the statute requires a different standard.
A.

FELA: METRO-NORTH

COMMUTER RAILROAD,

CO. v. BUCKLEY

0

Buckley, a railroad employee, worked as a pipefitter in the steam
tunnels of Grand Central Terminal. Metro-North Commuter Railroad
was his employer. For about three years, beginning in 1985, several
Metro-North employees, including Buckley, were exposed to massive
amount of asbestos while working in the steam tunnels. At the end of
the work day, the employees were so covered with asbestos powder that
they earned the nickname the "snowmen of Grand Central." MetroNorth knew the employees were working with asbestos and that it is
carcinogenic. For about two years, Metro-North did not warn the employees or provide safety training. In 1987, after the company was cited
for asbestos violations for a 1986 fire, Buckley and others were required
to attend an asbestos awareness class. Buckley learned that asbestos
can cause diseases, including cancer, and that he could decrease his
risk of lung cancer by quitting smoking. He received an ill-fitting face
mask, and learned an asbestos removal method that proved unworkable
in the hot steam tunnels. After he and several other pipefitters sought
legal redress, doctors examined Buckley. Though he had no adverse
health problems, the doctors said he had been exposed to a large quantity of asbestos, and that his increased risk of cancer was significant.
The latency period for asbestos-related illnesses is at least 10, and usually 20-40 years. The doctors recommended annual monitoring of Buckley's health.
Buckley sued Metro-North under the FELA, seeking damages for
his emotional distress and to cover the cost of medical monitoring. FELA
permits a railroad worker to recover for an injury resulting from his
employer's negligence."1 The district court granted judgment as a matter of law to Metro-North. The Second Circuit reversed, deciding that
80. 117 S. Ct. 2113 (1997).
81. See 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1994).
82. See Buckley, 117 S. Ct. at 2116.
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the asbestos exposure was a physical impact under FELA, and that it
was appropriate for a jury to hear Buckley's claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress and medical monitoring costs.8 3
There were two issues before the Court in Buckley. The first was
whether massive exposure to asbestos is a physical impact under FELA
sufficient to allow an employee to claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, even if the employee has not yet manifested physical
symptoms of disease. The second was whether an employee is entitled
to medical monitoring costs as damages from an emotional distress
claim in the absence of a physical impact.
The Court held that the FELA test for negligent infliction of emotional distress requires more than mere exposure to a substance, in the
absence of disease symptoms.8s In addition, without proof of physical
impact, medical monitoring damages are not allowed. 5
FELA's test for negligent infliction of emotional distress claims was
set forth in Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Gottshall,88 where the
87
Court said that an employee must meet the "zone of danger" test,
which requires a direct physical impact or an immediate risk of physical
harm. The Court read Gotshall as indicating that asbestos exposure is
not enough to constitute a physical impact. The Court noted that this
position is consistent with the common law concerning negligent infliction of emotional distress, as most courts do not allow recovery for
asymptomatic persons.88
The Court offered several policy reasons for its holding. If courts
were to permit plaintiffs such as Buckley to recover, it would be difficult
to filter out groundless claims.8 9 In addition, courts would have difficulty
determining the threshold at which exposure becomes substantial
enough to trigger liability.9" Given that many people are exposed to
carcinogens in every day life, a rule permitting asymptomatic plaintiffs
to recover for emotional distress would expose employers to a large
number of frivolous claims. 9' The Court applied the same policy argument to deny Buckley's claim for medical monitoring costs.
Ginsburg and Stevens dissented with respect to the Court's holding
on medical monitoring costs. The argument for holding employers responsible for monitoring costs has a powerful logic: once the employee
has been exposed to a carcinogen, and a physician recommends monitor-

83. See id.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See id. at 2117-2120.
See id. at 2121.
512 U.S. 532 (1994).
Id. at 547-548.
See Buckley, 117 S. Ct. at 2118.
See id. at 2118-19.
See id at 2119.
See id. at 2120.
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ing after determining the degree of exposure, it seems to follow that
the employer should pay the monitoring costs.
In spite of the attractiveness of the argument for compensating medical monitoring costs, the Court reached the right conclusion in my view.
At the bottom of this decision is a question concerning the status of the
"reasonable person" test in tort law. Allowing asymptomatic plaintiffs
to recover for medical monitoring costs would mean that the standards
governing compensation would be determined by health professionals,
who have an obvious incentive to recommend monitoring. The tort law
standards governing compensation, whether for emotional distress or
physical injury, are generally designed to filter out claims from overly
sensitive victims, for the simple reason that a liberal standard would
invite frivolous and opportunistic claimants. The Court's decision in
Buckley, though seemingly harsh, is consistent with this policy.
B.

LHWCA CASES

Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo92 presented the Court with
another employer liability case in which it had to reconcile common
law tort doctrine with statutory policy.
While working for Metropolitan as a longshore foreman, Rambo
injured his leg and back and received a disability benefit under the
LHWCA. After his injury, Rambo went to crane operator's school and
started making about three times his former salary in his new operator
position.
Metropolitan sought to modify Rambo's disability award under
LHWCA § 22, which allows modification if there has been "a change
in (the] conditions" of the award.9" The administrative law judge agreed
with Metropolitan, and terminated Rambo's benefits. The Benefits Review Board agreed that a change in earning capacity is a conditions
change under § 22.' The Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that "conditions" in § 22 refers to changes in physical conditions.95 The Supreme
Court reversed, agreeing with Metropolitan that a change in earnings
capacity is a § 22 conditions change.9 6 The Court remanded for consideration of other issues. The Ninth Circuit reinstated Rambo's benefits,
allowing a nominal award to preserve his right to future benefits, although there was no present loss of earning capacity.97
The issue before the Court this time was whether the LHWCA
should be interpreted to allow, in cases where there is no present decrease in wage-earning ability, a nominal award that will preserve the
right to future benefits. The Court held that such an award is permissi92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

117 S. Ct. 1953 (1997).
33 U.S.C. § 922 (1994).
See Rambo, 117 S. Ct. at 1956.
See id at 1957.
See id.
See id.
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ble under the statute when there is no loss of earning capacity but there
is a significant potential for a decrease in wage-earning ability in the
future."9
I have probably gone far enough in giving the nuts and bolts details
of a fairly narrow and technical decision. In plain terms, what is at stake
is this: even though Rambo made three times his previous earnings, he
faced the risk that if he lost his crane operating job, he would experience
a loss in earnings relative to what he could have earned if he had not
been injured. The nominal award would permit him to have his award
modified in the future to partially compensate for that loss. If the Court
held the nominal award impermissible under the LHWCA, Rambo
would not be able to seek compensation in the future because the
LHWCA bars claims for new, modified awards after one year from the
date of a denial of benefits. 99
I think there is a solid economic justification for the Court's holding,
which I think is also consistent with the purpose of the LHWCA and
workers compensation programs generally. One key difference between
workers compensation awards and ordinary tort awards is that the former tend to be paid out over time while the latter are lump sum awards
(unless a tort settlement requires payments over time). The employer's
risk is reduced in this scheme because he can have an award reduced
if the employee later increases his earnings. It follows from this that
the employee's risk should be reduced as well, and this is done by permitting the employee to seek an upward modification. If the employee can
seek upward modification of a small award in the event that an injury
immediately reduces his earnings by only a small amount, then the
employee should have the same option even when the injury does not
lead to an immediate reduction in earnings. Indeed, if an employee
knew that by accepting a job that paid him one dollar more than his
pre-injury wage he would risk losing future claims to benefits under
the program, he might be inclined to stay in a less desirable job.
The other LHWCA decision was Ingalls Shipbuilding,Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' CompensationPrograms,Departmentof Labor.'00
Unlike the other two employer liability cases this one did not address
the tensions between statutory and common law. The case involved the
wife of an employee who had been exposed to asbestos. The employee
sued and settled with eight asbestos manufacturers, and the settlements
required the wife to release her right to sue for loss of consortium and
in some cases wrongful death claims. This caused problems for the wife
later. She apparently was not aware of a provision in the LHWCA that
requires that persons who could get compensation under the Act, and
98. See id. at 1956.
99. See 33 U.S.C. § 922 (1994).
100. 117 S. Ct. 796 (1997).
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who make third party settlements for less than the value of their benefits under the Act, must have those agreements approved by the employer or forfeit the employee benefits.
The key issue before the Court was whether an employee's spouse
is entitled to death benefits under the LHWCA at the time of third
party settlements if the employee is not yet deceased. An affirmative
answer would mean that the wife had indeed forfeited her death benefits. 10 1 The Court held that under the LHWCA, a person entitled to
benefits is someone who is qualified to receive those benefits at the
time of the third party settlement. 0 2 Since the wife was not so qualified
at the time, she was not entitled
to the benefits, and therefore had not
10 3
forfeited her claim to them.
2. Employee Benefit Plans
ERISA generated four of the Court's labor and employment decisions this Term, one of them dealing with the scope of § 510,1°4 ERISA's
"non-interference" provision, and the other three dealing with preemption.
A.

NON-INTERFERENCE: INTER-MODAL RAIL EMPLOYEES AssOcL4TWON V.
1°5

ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY Co.

The Inter-Modal employees were parties to a collective bargaining
agreement between Santa Fe Terminal Services (SFTS) and the Teamsters Union which included pension, health, and welfare benefits. The
ATSF decided to end its affiliation with SFTS and made a new collective
bargaining agreement with ITS. Employees were terminated if they
did not begin working with ITS. The ITS-Teamsters Union collective
bargaining agreement had benefits that were less favorable. Employees
sued under Section 510 of ERISA, which states that it is unlawful to
"discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline or discriminate against a
participant or beneficiary [of an employee benefit plan] ...for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan."' 6 The employees claimed
that ATSF sought the new agreements with ITS in order to interfere
with their rights and benefits. The district court granted ATSF's motion
to dismiss their claims. 1 7 The Ninth Circuit reinstated the employees'

101. Ingalls also argued that the Office of Workers' Compensation Program (OWCP)
does not have standing to participate in an appeal from a Benefits Review Board ruling.
The Supreme Court held that FED. R. App. P. 15(a) allows the OWCP to appear. See id.
at 807-08.
102. See Ingalls Shipbuilding, 117 S. Ct. at 801.
103. Id. at 802.
104. 29 U.S.C. § 1100 (1994).
105. 117 S.Ct. 1513 (1997).
106. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1994).
107. See Inter-Modal Rail, 117 S. Ct. at 1515.
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claim under § 510 for interference with pension benefits.1 0 8 However,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the employees' claim for
interference with their welfare benefits on the ground that welfare benefits, unlike pension benefits, do not vest. 10 9
The issue before the Court was whether § 510 applies to welfare
plans or only to rights that vest. The Court held that § 510 of ERISA
applies to welfare plans also.
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, relied on the language of
the statute. The plain language of § 510 is broad and says "any plan"
which would include a welfare benefit plan, according to the definition
of a plan in 29 U.S.C. Section 1002(3). The Court noted that Congress
could have specified only vested plans in Section 510 but did not do so.
Since I often find decisions that refer to the plain language of the
statute hard to accept-especially in this case, where the Ninth Circuit
had come to the opposite conclusion on the basis of reading the statuteI find it helpful to think of the holding in its practical impact. The
employer is permitted under ERISA to unilaterally amend or eliminate
an employee welfare plan. So, for example, if an employer who has
offered health benefits to employees discovers that one of them has
AIDS, and decides to eliminate the plan in order to cut his costs, that
is permissible under ERISA. ° The Ninth Circuit decision would, it
seems, have permitted the employer to fire the AIDS victim without
having to worry about a lawsuit under Section 510 for interference with
the attainment of health benefits.'
For employees, the Court's decision may seem to be a victory, but
it is not a big one. One of the fundamental problems with ERISA is
that it "does not regulate the substantive content of welfare-benefit
plans," 2 and yet it also aims, through Section 510, to enhance the
credibility of employer promises. But if an employer can modify a welfare plan at any time, then his promise is not worth much to begin
with. For example, an employer who reads the holding of Inter-Modal
Rail Employees would recognize that he is better off eliminating or
modifying a health plan in order to limit the claims of an employee
who has contracted AIDS rather than firing that employee.
In the end, one is left with the impression that employees may be
better served by the common law of contracts rather than ERISA.
ERISA has led to a state of affairs in which employees who are adversely
impacted by an employer's decision to modify a welfare plan have virtu108. See id
109. See id
110. See e.g., McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991).

111. If this reading is correct, the decision would have contradicted the holdings of

several other courts. See Kross v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1983);
Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
112. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 732 (1985).
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ally no legal recourse, given that most ordinary contract claims are
preempted. They would be better off if someone from the government
called them and warned them that their employer-sponsored welfare
benefits could disappear at any time. At least then they would be aware
of the extent to which ERISA makes employer promises more credible.
B. ERISA PREEMPTION
The remaining benefit plan cases deal explicitly with the question
of ERISA preemption, which is a complicated field worthy of a separate
presentation by a specialist. I will not attempt to discuss the detailed
implications of these cases, I will merely review the holdings.
CaliforniaDivision of Labor StandardsEnforcement v. Dillingham
Construction,N.A. Inc.113 dealt with California's "baby Davis-Bacon"
statute, which requires a public works project contractor to pay its workers the prevailing wage in the project's locale.'14 The California wage
law also requires payment of prevailing wages to employees in apprenticeship programs that have not received state approval but allows the
payment of lower apprenticeship wages to employees participating in
state-approved programs. 5 An employer paid less-than-prevailing
wages to apprentices from a program that had not received state approval, and challenged the state's enforcement effort on the ground that
the prevailing wage law was preempted by ERISA. Thus, the issue
before the Court whether a state law regulating prevailing wages on
a public works contract "related to" an ERISA plan, and was thereby
preempted according to Section 514(a) of the statute.
The Court held that the wage law was not preempted.1 16 Wages
paid to employees on public works projects and the standards governing
apprenticeship training programs were too remote, in the Court's view,
from the areas of concern under ERISA to create a serious conflict between state and federal law." 7
In De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund,'
the trustees of a fund that administers an ERISA plan and runs health
facilities for current and retired longshore workers and their dependents
challenged a New York state tax that applies to hospitals. New York
state has a health facilities assessment (HFA) that taxes gross receipts
from patient services at different types of health facilities. 9 NYSA-ILA
paid the tax for a while, but then stopped payment and began litigation
to prevent New York from collecting the tax and to obtain a refund of
taxes paid. NYSA-ILA claimed that the HFA was preempted by Section

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

117 S. Ct. 832 (1997).
See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1771 (West 1994).
See id. § 1777.5 (West 1994).
See Dillingham, 117 S. Ct. at 840.
See id. at 840-41.
117 S. Ct. 1747 (1997).
See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-d (McKinney 1994).

Labor and the Supreme Court: Review of the 1996-1997 Term

293

514(a) of ERISA. In practical terms, NYSA-ILA wanted to create an
exception to the New York HFA for hospitals operated by ERISA plans.
The Court rejected this claim. The Court referred to the New York
HFA as a law of general applicability which, though imposing incidental
burdens on the administration of ERISA plans, did not "relate to" them
in the sense required by Section 514(a) case law. 2 °
The most controversial of our ERISA preemption cases is Boggs v.
Boggs, 2 ' though the controversy has more to do with the connections
among ERISA, state community property law, and state probate law.
The issue was whether ERISA preempts a state law regarding a testamentary transfer if it is by a non-participating spouse and involves
benefits from ERISA plans. The Court held that such a law is preempted. 122 It would take me too far from the general scope of this review
to go into the details of this case. A sense of its importance is given by
the first sentence of Justice Breyer's dissent: "The question in this case
is whether ERISA
'pre-empts' and thereby nullifies, state community
123
property law.'
D. Other Decisions
As is true of any Supreme Court Term, some of the decisions of this
one are too narrow or technical to cover in much detail in a review that
aims to hold the interest of a broad audience. Of course, I recognize
that what seems narrow to me may not seem so to others. I have included
here brief discussions of those cases on which I could say little beyond
simply reporting what the Court said.
1. Jones Act
The LHWCA excludes from its coverage "a master or member of a
crew of any vessel.' ' 124 These masters and crew members are entitled
to sue for damages under the Jones Act. Workers have an incentive to
file suit under the Jones Act for the same reason many employees would
like to escape the claim limits of the workers compensation system. For
this reason, it is important for courts to determine eligibility under the
12
Jones Act. The Court's decision in HarborTug and Barge, Co. v.Papai '
provides a detailed examination of the Jones Act eligibility issue.
The issue before the Court in Harbor Tug andBarge was whether a
worker with a history of temporary employment with the same employer
through hirings at the same union hall qualified as a seaman under
the Act. The Court set forth a detailed test for determining seaman
status, and held that an employee's seaman status is to be determined
120.
121.
122.
123.

See De Buono, 117 S. Ct. at 1752.
117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997).
See Boggs, 117 S. Ct. at 1758.
See id. at 1767.

124. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3XG).
125. 117 S. Ct. 1535 (1997).
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by his work on a seagoing vessel owned by his current employer, rather
than his work for prior employers whose vessels use the same union
hiring hall.12
2. FLSA
In Auer v. Robbins 127 a group of current and former police sergeants
with the City of St. Louis argued that they were entitled to overtime
pay under the FLSA.' 28 The test for exemption under the FLSA provided
in § 213 involves salary and duty components. 129 The duty test examines
the job responsibilities to see if they fall within Section 213(a)(1) categories. 13 ' The salary test is met if an employee is paid a set amount per
pay period and if that income cannot be reduced due to changes in
the quality and amount of work done.' 3 ' The police sergeants seeking
overtime pay challenged the application of this test to public employees
and the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of the salary test.
Two issues came before the Court: whether the Secretary of Labor's
salary test is a reasonable interpretation of the FLSA for public employees, and whether the Secretary's interpretation of the statute that deductions in pay "as a practical matter" make an employee eligible for
overtime pay was reasonable. Relying on deference rule of Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council Inc.,132 the Court held
that both of 3the Secretary of Labor's interpretations of the FLSA are
13
reasonable.
3. Two Procedural Decisions
Two decisions dealing largely with procedural issues deserve mention in this review. One is Johnson v. Fankell'" which held that a state
official defending a § 1983 action in state court does not have a federal
right to an interlocutory appeal after his claim of qualified immunity
is denied. 13 Had the same official been in federal court, he could have
taken an immediate appeal on the denial of qualified immunity under
Mitchell v. Forsyth,136 which held that a district court's denial of a quali137
fied immunity claim is appealable as a final order.
The other decision is Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,' which
held that the requirements for class certification of commonality of
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

See 117 S. Ct. at 1537.
117 S. Ct. 905 (1997).
See 29 U.S.C. § 207(aXl) (1994).
See 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1994).
See Auer, 117 S. Ct. at 908.
See id

132. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
133.
134.
135.
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See Auer, 117 S. Ct. at 909.
117 S. Ct. 1800 (1997).
See Johnson, 117 S. Ct. at 1807.
472 U.S. 511 (1985).
See Mitchell, 117 S. Ct. at 524-30.
117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
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issues of fact and adequacy of representation were not met in the case
of a massive global settlement of an asbestos class action.189 In holding
that the standards for class certification were not met, the Court focused
largely on the conflicts between the categories of injured and exposedbut-not-yet-injured plaintiffs, and the diversity within the categories
of plaintiffs.140 Currently injured class members have an incentive to
increase the amount allocated for their compensation even if it leads
to a reduction in the amounts set aside for future claimants. Within
each class, there were differences in the type, extent, and duration of
exposure; and in the type and extent of injury. Since product liability
class action suits on behalf of employees exposed to some cause of injury,
such as asbestos or cigarette smoke, are becoming increasingly popular
among trial lawyers, this decision reduces the set of potential tort claims
available to employees. In particular, it becomes questionable, after
Amchem, whether large class actions consisting of employees exposed
to some occupational hazard common to many work sites can be maintained.
V. Concluding Remarks
The Supreme Court's 1996-1997 Term was a quiet year in employment decisions. The NLRA, one of the oldest federal labor statutes and
arguably the centerpiece of federal labor legislation, produced not one
decision this Term. Several public sector employment cases came before
the Court but only one, Gilbert v. Homar, dealt primarily with an employment law issue. The others centered around the issue of immunity
from tort liability. The remaining cases for the most part involved narrow questions of statutory interpretation. There were no decisions that
dramatically reshaped employment law doctrine in any area.
Despite the lack of fireworks and scarcity of general propositions,
there are broader messages buried in this term's decisions. The one
that stands out for me is the Court's apparent concern for incentives.
The statutory interpretation holdings of this Term are defended with
arguments referring to the plain language of the relevant statute. But
in just about every one of these cases the Court happens to reach the
right decision in maintaining incentives for employers to comply with
the relevant statutes. Although only one Justice, Breyer, explicitly relies on incentive-based arguments in his opinions, these decisions give
me the impression that the Court as a whole is keenly aware and concerned with the incentives created by its decisions. If that is too obvious
perhaps I should put in a stronger form: I think one can predict the
outcome, in those cases in which the Court is asked to determine the
scope of a statute, by determining which of the two proposed interpreta139. See Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2249.
140. Id at 2239.
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tions does the least damage to the employer's incentive to comply with
the statute. This claim certainly applies to the two Title VII cases decided this Term, which, though narrow, serve as adequate representatives of the Court's work this Term on employment statutes.
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Figure A-4
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